IPTO: Indo-Pacific Treaty Organization
To safeguard post-WWII international order, NATO needs to be complemented with IPTO.
In its June 4, 2023 article, “The Battle for Eurasia,” Foreign Policy magazine wrote:
“Revisionist autocracies — China, Russia, Iran, and, to a lesser degree, North Korea — aren’t simply pushing for power in their respective regions. They are forming interlocking strategic partnerships across the world’s largest landmass, and they are fostering trade and transportation networks beyond the reach of the U.S. dollar and the U.S. Navy.”
In my earlier March 20, 2023 commentary, “The CRINK in U.S. Foreign Policy,” I had warned that an identical “new, autocratic ‘axis of anti-freewill’ is ascendant on the world stage.” The CRINK acronym — China, Russia, Iran and North Korea — represented a sequential threat, in order of importance, that each of these ideologically aligned nations posed to the post-WWII international order.
But the Foreign Policy article noted, “This isn’t, yet, a full-blown alliance of autocracies. It is, however, a bloc of adversaries more cohesive and dangerous than anything the United States has faced in decades.” It’s important to point out that Foreign Policy’s analysis of the developing CRINK threat was based on a broader “Eurasian” perspective per its expansive declaration, “All the great conflicts of the modern era have been contests over Eurasia, where dueling coalitions have clashed for dominance of that supercontinent and its surrounding oceans.” The article went on to discuss in depth how the CRINK axis’ pursuit of a strategy of “Eurasian integration will make Washington’s antagonists less vulnerable to sanctions and strengthen them militarily.”
The focus of my current essay is primarily the Indo-Pacific region, as I believe the NATO alliance (given its current expansion plans) adequately addresses the security needs of the European part of Eurasia. However, we don’t have anywhere close to such a comprehensive military alliance that tackles the security needs of the Asian part of Eurasia, especially given the rise of an increasingly aligned CRINK axis.
Multi-alignment is the new non-alignment strategy in much of the developing world.
In his June 2, 2023 opinion column, “The United States can no longer assume that the rest of the world is on its side,” in The Washington Post, Fareed Zakaria made this very blunt comment with regards to the Ukraine War:
“And the war itself has only highlighted a broader phenomenon: Many of the largest and most powerful countries in the developing world are growing increasingly anti-Western and anti-American.”
Mr. Zakaria went on to say:
“As these countries have become economically strong, politically stable and culturally proud, they have also become more nationalist, and their nationalism is often defined in opposition to the countries that dominate the international system — meaning the West. Many of these nations were once colonized by Western nations, and so they retain an instinctive aversion to Western efforts to corral them into an alliance or grouping.”
In fact, in its earlier May 31, 2023 analysis, “The Indo-Pacific Has Already Chosen Door №3,” Foreign Policy magazine had already made some observations that concurred with Mr. Zakaria’s views by noting that even as “…Washington seeks to persuade so-called ‘fence-sitters’ — countries such as India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Vietnam — to join its coalition to counter China…” that “…few Indo-Pacific countries assess the choice in front of them in dichotomous terms.”
The Foreign Policy article added that “…many countries share neither the United States’ perception of the Chinese threat nor the Biden administration’s simplistic vision of the world separated into autocratic and democratic states.” The article further noted it was “…because interests, not values, guide the policy choices of states in the Indo-Pacific.”
The Foreign Policy article concluded, in part, “Multi-alignment, like that adopted by Papua New Guinea, is not neutrality but rather an active decision made to build friendly ties with multiple major powers, working most closely with whichever partner best suits the country’s security and economic interests on a given issue.”
U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy hinges on “Indo” participation.
In his May 1, 2023, Foreign Affairs magazine essay, “America’s Bad Bet on India,” Ashley J. Tellis concluded rather starkly:
“But on the most burdensome challenge facing Washington in the Indo-Pacific — securing meaningful military contributions to defeat any potential Chinese aggression — India will likely refuse to play a role in situations where its own security is not directly threatened.”
Mr. Tellis went on to caution the Biden Administration:
“The United States should certainly help India to the degree compatible with American interests. But it should harbor no illusions that its support, no matter how generous, will entice India to join it in any military coalition against China. The relationship with India is fundamentally unlike those that the United States enjoys with its allies. The Biden administration should recognize this reality rather than try to alter it.”
A couple weeks later the Economist, in its May 17, 2023 commentary, “Henry Kissinger explains how to avoid world war three,” suggested a possible workaround based on Kissinger’s take on the situation that it felt might appeal to India:
“Mr. Kissinger’s model for pragmatic thinking is India. He recalls a function at which a former senior Indian administrator explained that foreign policy should be based on non-permanent alliances geared to the issues, rather than tying up a country in big multilateral structures.”
The Economist went on to add:
“India is an essential counterweight to China’s growing power. Yet it also has a worsening record of religious intolerance, judicial bias and a muzzled press. One implication — though Mr. Kissinger did not directly comment — is that India will therefore be a test of whether America can be pragmatic.”
A pragmatic case for IPTO.
Walter Russell Mead in his June 6 ,2023 Wall Street Journal column, “What if Putin Loses His War in Ukraine?” contemplated as follows:
“A Russian defeat would basically strengthen America’s hand globally, but there would be complications. On the plus side, with Russian expansionism firmly checked, the task of maintaining the status quo in Europe would require less U.S. investment.”
However, Mr. Mead cautioned:
“An enfeebled, embittered Kremlin could throw itself into China’s waiting embrace. Russian instability could pose huge security challenges.”
Nonetheless, a weakened Russia aligned with a stronger China has positive implications for India’s greater participation in the U.S.’s evolving Indo-Pacific strategy. An assertive China is a grave threat to India with its claims to large chunks of Indian territory in the Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh regions. A militarily defeated Russia cannot continue to be a reliable supplier of military hardware to India in a post-Ukraine War era.
But then, in its June 15, 2023 article, “India’s foreign minister on ties with America, China and Russia,” the Economist noted a wariness expressed by India’s foreign minister, Mr. Jaishankar, regarding western alliances:
“Unlike many in Washington, India does not see the world in terms of a cold-war-style duality, pitting American-led countries against those hewing to China. It sees an emerging dance of big powers — chiefly America, China, Russia and itself — in which it will engage multiple partners, albeit to different degrees.”
The Economist further noted:
“Mr. Jaishankar insists that those around Joe Biden, America’s president, well understand the looser, more uncertain and sometimes contradictory international relations that a multipolar world will foster. ‘I think they’re acutely conscious that the post-1945 order has been severely challenged and that they need a new template, new partners, that they need to look beyond alliance constructs.’”
While his point is well taken, Mr. Jaishankar must recognize the fallibility of India pursuing a “multi-alignment” strategy with two–one former (Russia) and one future (China) — superpowers that are clearly at cross-purposes with its own larger interests. India’s skepticism of former colonial powers and Euro-centric power structures cannot extend to the United States, which itself was a subject of colonial rule.
The urgency of now for IPTO.
The Wall Street Journal began its June 4, 2023 editorial, “China’s Military Provocations,” as follows:
“The risk of conflict in the Western Pacific is growing as China raises the military stakes with a goal of dominating the region.”
It then went on to list some of China’s provocative actions against the U.S. and its allies in a period of just the prior two weeks. A few days earlier, on June 1 ,2023, Alastair Gale, its Asia Security Correspondent in his report, “China’s Missile Threat Drives New U.S. Approach in Asia ,” had provided an overview of revised military tactics being undertaken by the U.S. to prepare for China’s increasing belligerence in the Pacific. Mr. Gale described the new U.S. strategy as follows:
“…a shift away from a heavy reliance on big military bases that have been the linchpin of the American presence in Asia for decades.”
“… giving priority to a hub-and-spoke model that would move many aircraft away from large bases to an array of smaller facilities, especially if a conflict is looming.”
Mr. Gale described in some detail, the U.S. military’s expansion of military assets into several small sites throughout the Pacific, including the Philippines, Papua New Guinea and Australia to counter a growing Chinese threat.
The whole (IPTO) is greater than the sum of its parts.
The United States has many different military alliances/partnerships (some going back several decades) and conducts defense-related military exercises throughout the Indo-Pacific with various nations and even with groups of countries. Here’s a partial list:
· US-Australia-India-Japan — Quad
· US-Philippines — MDT
· US-Japan Alliance — TMCS
· US-Australia — ANZUS
· US-Indonesia — IMET & Garuda Shield.
But none of these have the all-encompassing breadth and power of NATO — the North Atlantic Treaty Organization — which was formed back in 1949 as part of a collective defense arrangement with Western European nations to withstand an armed attack by the Soviet Union on any of NATO’s member countries. NATO has been hugely successful in not only defending its charter but has grown from the original 12 founding members to 31 member nations today.
The United States and its allies in the Indo-Pacific region are currently threatened not only by an increasingly belligerent China, but also by a rapidly evolving CRINK axis in the near future. It is time for the U.S. to make a case for IPTO — a comprehensive NATO-style military alliance — Indo-Pacific Treaty Organization to include the following 12 nations:
· United States
· Australia
· India
· Indonesia
· Japan
· Malaysia
· New Zealand
· Philippines
· Singapore
· South Korea
· Thailand
· Vietnam
It is uncertain that even half of the nations listed above will sign on but if we get the other half to begin with, we would be making a huge commitment to the success of the so-called Indo-Pacific century. This success would not just be based on individual IPTO nations’ economic interests but also on a collective set of values that are embodied in the world’s liberal democracies. Also, the resulting new world order would be equally distributed between a Euro-centric NATO and an Asia-centric IPTO to ensure, what Foreign Policy magazine called, “The Battle for Eurasia” is never lost to the CRINK axis.
